Volume 86

Issue 4

Article 4

June 1984

The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State
Mark Tushnet
Georgetown University Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State, 86 W. Va. L. Rev. (1984).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Tushnet: The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State

West Virginia Law Review
Summer 1984

Volume 86

Number 4

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE
MARK TUSHNET*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970 the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly,' that the Constitution
guaranteed a relatively formal hearing to any recipient of public assistance whose
benefits were threatened with termination. Goldberg can be seen in at least two
ways. First, it was one of the last great decisions embodying the humane instincts
of the Warren Court. It is unlikely that Goldberg would be decided in the same
way today, after a decade and a half of doctrinal development.2 The erosion of
Goldberg's holding is related to the second perspective on the case. In this second
perspective, it is seen as the Supreme Court's recognition that the growth of the
welfare state required some response from those who regard enforcing the Constitution as a primary method of regulating government conduct. 3 Prior to the 1950s,
benefits received from the government were taken to be privileges, not rights, and
were therefore immune from regulation under constitutional norms.' Whatever the
analytic merits of the right/privilege distinction-and, as we will see, they are so
substantial that the distinction, though expressly interred, is regularly reincarnated-it
seemed to make little sense to treat the massive governmental activities of the welfare
state as equivalent to the relatively limited activities of its predecessor in the ideology
of liberalism, the night-watchman state.
In an influential article relied on by the Court in Goldberg, Charles Reich call-

ed the benefits provided by the welfare state "the new property," serving for their
beneficiaries the same social purposes as land and stocks served for their owners,

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Harvard University, 1967; J.D.,
M.A., Yale University, 1971.
A shorter version of this Article was delivered as the Donley Lectures at the West Virginia College
of Law, October 6-7, 1983. It develops insights of Alexander, The New Prison Administrators and
the Court: New Directionsin Prison Law, 56 TEx. L. REv. 963 (1978). I have profited from comments
by Steven Goldberg, Pat Gudridge, Joel Handler, Douglas Laycock, Gerry Spann, and participants
in the Legal History Program at the University of Wisconsin, 1983.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 431 (1977).
Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg explicitly links the decision to the growth of the welfare
state. 397 U.S. at 271-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
4 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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and deserving the same kinds of protection against arbitrary government action.,
This Article explores the meaning the Court has given to the new property. The
Court's meaning is not what Reich expected, but it has a logic of its own. That
logic expresses the Court's vision of welfare state bureaucracies. But because the
categories of the Court's logic do not match the usual categories of constitutional
analysis, my presentation will necessarily have several layers. Though the presentation is structured around the traditional categories, I will develop a number of
unusual perspectives, which ought to be made clear at the outset.
After a brief excursion to remind us that the welfare state is also the national
security state, I examine the issue of when the government must provide nonarbitrary procedures as a predicate for its action. I first discuss the analytic issues
the Court has raised, and argue that the Court has managed to develop a body
of law that cannot make sense on its own terms. I then discuss what I call the
pragmatics of the question, to disclose the patterns that underlie the Court's disposition of the cases. Here I introduce the main theme of the Article, which is that
the Court's decisions present a vision of welfare state bureaucracies as rationalized
and professionalized, terms that I will define in a moment. After elaborating and
qualifying this thesis, I turn to the second standard issue, that of defining the contours of the procedures the state must use when it is obliged to use non-arbitrary
ones. Here too a preference for professionalism appears. I then examine a number
of areas in which the Court has expressly adopted professional norms as constitutional standards, a development that puzzles some observers6 but which is entirely
consistent with my thesis. In the concluding section I examine and reject the major
alternatives that commentators have offered to the Court's approach to the second
traditional issue, and offer my own proposal.
To introduce my major thesis, I need to rely at least to some extent on a
sociology of bureaucracies. All welfare state bureaucracies face serious problems
of control, because the "street-level" bureaucrats who actually deliver goods or
services to recipients ordinarily have a great deal of discretion regarding the granting of benefits, their size, and their timing.7 Superiors in the bureaucracy need
to control these discretionary decisions in order to assure that general state policies
- that just the right amount of goods and services be provided to the right people
- are advanced. For present purposes we can distinguish among three types of
welfare state bureaucracies according to the methods by which superiors assert
control.' First, both analytically and historically, superiors in politicized
bureaucracies assert control by guaranteeing that subordinates adhere to a political
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. Rlv. 85, 125.
'See

M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BuREAUCRAcY: DILEmMAs OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SER-

VICE (1980), for a general view of the problems of hierarchical control in bureaucracies where subordinates must have substantial discretion.
I It is worth noting the bureaucracies I discuss all involve persons in situations of dependency.
A formal definition of welfare state bureaucracies might focus on their role in distributing various
benefits, provided from tax dollars, to recipients who thereby become dependent on bureaucracies.
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program set by the superiors. Second, superiors in rationalizedbureaucracies assert
control by promulgating and enforcing rules that regulate the subordinates. Finally, superiors in professionalbureaucracies assert control by participating jointly
with subordinates in developing a project, with both material and ideological components, to extend the scope of professional norms with a base outside the
bureaucracy.
The distinction among types of bureaucracies plays a central role in what follows.
The prototypical politicized bureaucracy is the classic urban machine, which dispensed jobs on city projects, assistance to the needy, and relaxation of rules that
otherwise restricted the citizenry's pleasures, all to the end of securing the political
allegiance of recipients and street-level bureaucrats. 9 The prototypical rationalized
bureaucracy is the Social Security Administration, which dispenses benefits according to a rigid set of rules defining exactly what contributions entitle recipients to
how much in benefits. The prototypical professional bureaucracy is the child welfare
agency in which social workers are supposed to act on their judgment about what
is in the best interest of the child. Even though no real bureaucracy truly exemplifies
one of these pure forms, I will treat some mixed types as falling in only one category.
In particular, I will treat as a rationalized bureaucracy an agency in which the
superiors use professional norms as a basis for developing rules that they impose
on their subordinates.
The main theme of this Article is that the Court envisions the welfare state
as composed primarily of rationalized and professional bureaucracies. This is emphatically not to say that the welfare state is in fact made up of such bureaucracies,
or that a "sound" law of due process can be developed by taking account of modern
social science regarding the modes by which superiors in bureaucracies control their
subordinates. Rather, my argument is that the Court is constituting the welfare
state by articulating its vision of bureaucracies, that the constitution of the welfare
state occurs almost subliminally as the Court uses what seem to be natural categories
in an entirely unselfconscious way, and that the categories-and therefore the constitution of the welfare state-are not at all natural. That is the point of the Article's concluding section.
The Court has made the Constitution applicable to rationalized and professional bureaucracies by treating the rules of a rationalized bureaucracy as creating
property-like entitlements and by adopting professional norms as constitutional
ones. The rules and norms, though treated here as methods of ordering relations
within bureaucracies, also give rise to rights in beneficiaries, which affects the actual
enforcement of the rules and norms." Further, although the Court has developed
See generally D. BELL, TBE END OF IDEOLOGY 141-50 (1962).
Two distinctions should be noted. First, street-level bureaucrats engage in relations in two
directions, one with their superiors and one with the recipients of benefits. My thesis is that efforts
by superiors to control subordinates affect the relations between subordinates and recipients as well.
Second, superiors can assert two kinds of control. They may try to regulate internal operations of
the bureaucracy, through rules that regulate hiring and firing, and they may try to regulate the relations
10
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doctrines that prevent beneficiaries from securing judicial control over politicized
bureaucracies through the due process clause, it has developed other doctrines that
provide incentives to both superiors and subordinates to convert politicized
bureaucracies into rationalized or professional ones. The bulk of this Article is
devoted to explaining how one can reorganize the usual categories of analysis so
that these themes come to the fore."
The conclusion discusses scholarly efforts to justify the Court's scheme or to
provide an alternative that uses traditional categories more attractively. As I hope
to make clear, justification is impossible because the welfare state bureaucracies,
as they actually exist, serve functions of social containment that belie the promises
of rules and professional norms. But alternatives cast in traditional terms are equally
impossible, and for the same reason. In evaluating alternatives, it is useful to
recognize that they are defeated by their acceptance of the hierarchy of superiors,
subordinates, and recipients. A better alternative, I will suggest, is a repoliticized
bureaucracy of a certain sort. Rationalized and professional bureaucracies can be
repoliticized in different ways. Politics can be reinserted in rationalized bureaucracies
by injecting mechanisms of community control, and in professional ones by insisting on participation by clients in the bureaucrats' decisions. Yet these modes
blur into each other as the community that controls becomes the organized client
constituency. The Court's disapproval of politics in bureaucracies indicates how
radical these suggestions are.
II.

Excuxsus:

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WELFARE STATE

I can highlight what comes later by a brief preliminary on an aspect of the
welfare state that is not at all the subject of constitutional law. In addition to providing various forms of material security to its beneficiaries, the welfare state also
purchases goods and services on a massive scale, especially for defense and construction of public facilities. Essentially none of these purchases are subjected to
constitutional scrutiny,' 2 and the reasons reveal something about the possibilities
between subordinates and recipients, through rules that specify who should get what. Smolla, The

Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of Protesting Too
Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 119 (1982), hints at this second distinction in an effort to justify the
Court's decisions. These two kinds of control can be exercised in different institutional forms. Most
dramatically, superiors may (be forced to) share control over internal operations with public-employee
unions, while retaining control over substantive rules. Again my thesis concerns the form of control:
politics, rules or professional norms. It seems to me likely that no matter what the institutional mechanisms,
the forms of control will be the same in any particular bureaucracy.
" As the analysis develops, we will see that the image of the rationalized bureaucracy dominates
the cases involving deciding when process is due, while that of the professional bureaucracy dominates
those involving deciding what process is due. I suspect that this division is an artifact of the decided
cases, but it may reflect something systematic that I have overlooked.
" There are minor manifestations of the Constitution in the national security state. For example,
contractors can invoke the due process clause to challenge the procedures by which they are barred
from contracts because of their failure to comply with affirmative action requirements. Similarly, issues
that in other contexts are constitutional appear in this sector as statutory issues because of the ability
of contractors to mobilize the political process to their advantage. See, e.g., Forsham v. Harris, 445
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for repoliticized bureaucracies.' 3
I have already suggested that, given the way the Court sees things, rights in

beneficiaries to constitutional protections flow primarily from internal arrangements
for control in the bureaucracy. One reason that the Constitution has no bearing

on government contracts is that the organizations receiving grants are private agencies whose internal arrangements are free from constitutional control and whose

beneficiaries therefore have no derivative constitutional rights. Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn makes this clear." There a nominally private school provided educational
services to children with "special needs" such as drug problems. State and federal
law required that the students receive an education, and the school received essentially all of its operating funds from contracts with local school boards to provide
the special kinds of education that the boards were unable to provide themselves.
Rendall-Baker taught at the school. She criticized its board of directors for their
educational policies, whereupon she was fired. Had her employer been a school
board, that would have violated her right to free expression. But because the board

of directors was private, Rendell-Baker was not protected by the Constitution.' 5
Government contractors differ from other recipients of the welfare state's
benefits in other ways. First, especially in the defense industry, the government
either is a monopsonist - the only possible purchaser of the goods - or has substantial market power. Contractors are reluctant to disrupt working relationships by
bringing in a new player, the courts, and especially new rules, the Constitution.
In contrast, recipients of public assistance may annoy superiors by challenging their
U.S. 169 (1980), which in other contexts would be seen as a "state action" decision.
"1 The welfare state and the national security state are historically linked. In order to secure and
then maintain American hegemony over the world capitalist economy, a large military effort was required. Devoting resources to that end, however, threatened to deprive the government of the domestic
support essential to stability. The welfare state provides enough benefits to preserve stability and, at
least until the 1970s, American hegemony allowed the state to finance those benefits from its dominant
position in the world economy. See A. WoiYE, THE LIMITs OF LEGITImACY: POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS
IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALIsM (1978). The massive institutionalization of the American welfare state

after World War II accompanied the rise of the national security state. The initial steps toward the
welfare state had been taken in the early twentieth century, when Progressive reformers developed a
rationale for public assistance that combined themes of humanitarianism and social control. Although
the peacetime military establishment remained small until 1945, the conceptual basis for defending its
growth had been laid earlier. See G. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CrvM WAR (1968); S. SKOWRONEK,
BUILDING A NEW A sucAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920

(1982). The latter work contains a useful examination of the transformation of American military
capacities.
" 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
" The Court hinted that she would have been protected by the Constitution had the state regulated
the school's employment practices. Id. at 836. This is yet another version of the positivist trap, see text
accompanying notes 27-28 infra, for the state would regulate those practices only to a specific extent,
beyond which it would leave decisions to the "private" parties. In unregulated areas of employment practices, Rendell-Baker would be in exactly the position she found herself when the state did not regulate
employment at all. For an interesting pre-Rendell-Bakercase arising in the national security sector, see
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., Avco Lycoming Div., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975).
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policies, but that is unlikely to affect the discretionary decisions made by the streetlevel bureaucracts. Second, and related to the first, government contractors have
enough political power to influence the development of statutory protections of

their interests. In this sense they do not need the Constitution to protect them.
Again, recipients of public assistance lack substantial political power and must call
on the courts for aid in controlling the bureaucracy.

Finally, and perhaps most important, government contractors want to preserve
the opportunity for political intervention on their behalf. It is useful to have things
set up so that a senator can call the right person to influence the award of a
contract. 6 The demise of urban political machines meant the elimination of those
opportunities for recipients of public assistance.' 7 As we will see, some of the present law of the bureaucracy erects obstacles to the reemergence of such machines.
Taken together, these aspects of government contracting show how important
politics is in the ordering of relationships in this branch of the welfare state.
Eliminating politics from the other branch may have the effect of diffusing potential threats to political stability.
III.

WHN

DoEs

THE CONSTITUTION APPLY?: ANALYTICS

Before the growth of the welfare state, it seemed easy to decide when the Constitution applied. The due process clauses provide that governments may not deprive
people of life, liberty, or property without due process. If a government took some
stuff away from you, it had to use fair procedures. And "stuff" was meant almost
literally. The operative image was that you had some land, or some cash in your
pocket, and a government official wanted to take it away.' 8 As governments began
to regulate the use of property of which people retained formal ownership, this
image became harder to make real. Property began to seem, not some tangible
"stuff," but a group of rights to use tangible stuff subject to various kinds of
regulation. Still, an owner might be thought of as someone who had a bunch of
those rights in his or her pocket, and then the image of deprivation could work
- for a while.
All of this broke down over the course of the twentieth century. In constitutional law one key moment came in 1972, two years after Goldberg. Goldberg had
treated public assistance as a form of property, but without extensive analysis. The
Court said, "Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified
to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important
rights."' 9 As Justice Black pointed out in dissent, the first sentence concealed a
" For a dramatic example, see Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA
Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747 (1982), recounting the intervention of a senator to preserve
the Tellico Darn after a cabinet-level committee had concluded that the costs of completing the dam
outweighed the benefits a fully-operating dam would provide.
" See D. BELL, supra note 9.
" See generally, B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).

11397 U.S. at 262 (footnote omitted). The footnote quotes from and cites to articles by Charles
Reich.
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serious problem. The recipient was entitled to the benefits only if she or he satisfied
the statutory requirements, but in the case at hand the state officials had claimed
exactly that the recipient did not satisfy the requirements and so was not entitled
to the benefits.20 Justice Black argued further that the second sentence, invoking
the importance of the rights, had two troublesome implications. First, the Court
had rhapsodized about the "desperate" situation of a recipient "deprived of the
very means by which to live while he waits," in order to distinguish Goldberg from
prior cases involving "blacklisted government contractor[s and] discharged government employee[s]."' But Black, as we know from other contexts, regarded "importance" and similar standards as inadequate to control willful judges. Second,
Black noted that "[t]he operation of a welfare state is a new experiment for our
Nation." He did not want these "new experiments in carrying out a welfare program. . . [to] be frozen into our constitutional structure." 22
A.

The Positivists Approach and Its Trap

Two years after Goldberg, the Court adopted a position that met the concerns
Black had expressed. In Board of Regents v. Roth, an untenured professor at the
University of Wisconsin was not rehired when his contract expired.23 He sued the
Regents, claiming that they had not rehired him because of some speeches he had
made, and that, in any event, due process required that the Regents give him at
least a statement of the reasons for their decisions. As the case was presented to
the Supreme Court, only the due process issue was involved, but the Court did
note that Roth might still prevail on his first amendment claim.2 However, it rejected his due process claim. The Constitution protected liberty and property against
deprivation without due process. But not every interest that a litigant regarded as
important was liberty or property. Property interests "are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. ..."
A person like Roth was entitled to due process only if state law created "a legitimate
claim of entitlement." 25 Thus, what mattered was not the importance of the interest affected but whether state law recognized the interest as one deserving protection. Experimentation in the welfare state could continue so long as states figured
out that they should define the interests affected by experiments in ways that did
not create legitimate claims of entitlement.
Justice Black's other concern was implicitly addressed in Roth. When Justice
Rehnquist later made the point explicitly, a majority of the Court and most commentators vehemently rejected it, believing that Rehnquist had converted Roth's
reliance on positive lav into a positivist trap. Yet, I will argue, no one has been
20 Id. at 274-75 (Black, J., dissenting).

11 Id.
22 Id.
23 408
Id.
I,
2I

at 264.
at 279 (Black, J.,dissenting).
U.S. 564 (1972).
at 574-75 and n.14.
Id. at 577.
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able to devise a satisfactory analytic alternative. Arnett v. Kennedy involved Kennedy, a nonprobationary federal employee who worked in a regional office of the
federal poverty agency. 1 He was fired by his superior on the ground that Kennedy had falsely stated in public that the superior had attempted to bribe a grant
recipient by offering it a $100,000 grant if its officers signed a statement against
Kennedy. As civil service statutes required, Kennedy received a notice of the proposed firing and was given an opportunity to appear before his superior to answer
the charges. Under the statutes, a trial-type hearing was available only after the
firing. If Kennedy prevailed on appeal from the firing in that hearing, he would
be reinstated and receive back pay. Kennedy claimed that due process required a
trial-type hearing before removal, and a decision by an impartial decision-maker,
not by the very person whom he had charged with bribery. The Supreme Court
rejected Kennedy's claim. Two Justices said that, in light of the government's interest in efficient operation, the statutory procedures satisfied due process.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by two others, took a broader position. He argued
that the due process clause was irrelevant in the circumstances. Roth established
that Kennedy had to have a legitimate claim of entitlement, grounded in a source
like positive state or federal law, in order to have a property interest protected
by the due process clause. But, according to Justice Rehnquist, when one looked
at the relevant positive law, one saw in it a combination of substantive provisions
giving civil service employees various rights, and procedural provisions describing
the manner in which those rights can be terminated. Reviewing the history of the
civil service system, Rehnquist concluded that the combination of substantive and
procedural provisions formed an unbreakable package: "where the grant of a
substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures
which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of
[Kennedy] must take the bitter with the sweet." 7 In an argument that echoed Black's
concerns in Goldberg, Rehnquist pointed out that the package embodied a compromise in which those who feared that a civil service system would be rigid and
inefficient were pacified by provisions allowing quicker action than people in Kennedy's position would have liked.
If Roth's reliance on positive law as the source of entitlements is accepted,
it is hard to resist the analytic force of this argument. Nor can it be confined to
situations in which the legislative history explicitly reveals a compromise between
substance and procedure. Assume that a legislature enacts a substantive entitlement and relies on existing law, such as a long-established administrative procedure act, to provide the procedures for divesting the entitlement, or commits
to an agency the decision about what procedures to employ. The argument from
compromise is that the legislature gave the entitlement the scope that it did, and
not a narrower one, because it knew what the procedures were or trusted the agency,
26 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
27

Id. at 153-54 (Rehnquist, J., for plurality).
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not the courts, to come up with appropriate ones. The difficulty, as Justice Powell
said in Arnett, is that relying on positive law to define a package containing entitlements and procedures deprives the due process clause of any independent
content.2 8 When the legislature creates an entitlement, the procedures it creates (or
relies on) satisfy due process by definition. Further, as Douglas Laycock has pointed
out, the positivist trap conflicts with the syntax of the due process clause, which
reads as if people first have property which they then cannot lose except by fair
29
procedures.
B.

Alternative Approaches

No one has been able to develop an alternative that accepts Roth's reliance
on positive law to create substantive entitlements. Two unsatisfactory approaches
are commonly suggested. One accepts Roth and tries to distinguish between old
forms of property, as to which entitlements are independent of procedures, and
new ones, as to which entitlements and procedures are a package, unless the new
ones are so much like the old ones in relevant respects that the courts should require due process. The problem with this approach is that the distinction and analogy
between some forms of new property and the old property cannot be sustained.
The second approach rejects Roth and argues that the fairness of the procedures
depends on the importance of the interests affected whether or not those interests
are recognized as entitlements by positive law. The problems with this approach
are that there are no satisfactory criteria of importance, and that it blurs the intuitively appealing distinction between new and old property.
Both approaches begin with the perception that we grasp the meaning of the
due process clause by starting with an image of property as material stuff that
we can hold in our hands: land, houses, tables, and chairs. This old property has
a number of characteristics, of which two are important here. Old property was
protected by a variety of positive provisions of statutory and common law, which
seem initially to be stable, unlikely to be altered; this characteristic lies behind the
first approach, which I will label "traditionalist." Also, when we have old property
in our hands, we are allowed to do pretty much what we want with it so that we
can achieve a number of goals we value; this characteristic lies behind the second
approach, which I will label "natural law."
1. The Traditionalist Approach
The stability of protection given old property animates the traditionalist
approach, which tries to analogize old property to some forms of new property.
But extending protection to some forms of new property and continuing the protection given old property are difficult to justify in the welfare state.
Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
Laycock, Due Processand Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clauses
Nonjusticiable, 60 TEx. L. Rav. 875, 879-82 (1982).
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With the development of regulation in the welfare state, the sense of old property as material stuff begins to dissolve. Treating property as protected by substantive entitlements independent of procedures works only so long as the substantive
entitlements remain stable over a relatively long period. You own your house and
feel protected by the law in your ownership. But suppose you try to add a modern
wing to it, and discover that external alterations are prohibited by a law designating
your neighborhood as a historic district. It begins to seem as if your ownership
is qualified by the historic preservation law. And if you feel aggrieved because you
never knew that the neighborhood would be so designated, you will begin to think
your ownership was qualified by the procedures for creating historic preservation
districts. Thus, even as to the material stuff that is at the heart of the old property,
the entitlement theory begins to collapse the distinction between substance and
procedure.30 Laycock argues that traditional or old property forms "the core" of
the substantive concepts involved in these cases, and that we should try to work
from that core to the boundaries: "Clear cases shape our understanding of concepts and thus guide the analysis of hard cases." ' 3' But the clarity cannot be sustained in the welfare state.3 2 The traditionalist approach preserves the symmetry
between the old and the new property, not by extending protection
to new property
33
but by recognizing that old property is unprotected too.
In addition, the traditionalist approach gives us no criteria for moving from
the core to the boundaries, except to appeal to intuitions about resemblances between old and new property. Those intuitions are codified in the natural law
approach.
2. The Natural Law Approach
The second main approach to new property develops the theme of "importance" that troubled Black in Goldberg.34 The Court in Roth was concerned that
every aspect of the welfare state ought not be constitutionalized. It set the limit
of constitutional protection at entitlements created by positive law. The natural
law approach rejects that limit and creates another one. I have mentioned that
old property is valuable because it allows us to carry out life-plans that are important to us. Charles Reich argued that new property served exactly the same purpose. The natural law approach pursues the analogy by setting the limit of constitutional protection at interests or benefits which are similarly important in allowing
recipients to carry out their life-plans.
This approach is vulnerable from several directions. First, as I have argued

30

Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property".Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative

State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 463 (1977).
" Laycock, supra note 29, at 882.
32 See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 18.
3 See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1463 n.73.
4

See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 407, 409 (clause protects "all interests valued by sensible men").
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elsewhere, we do not have available to us natural law criteria that identify important interests in a way that satisfies the demand for controls of judicial willfulness.
Every plaintiff will claim that his or her interest is important enough to require
more procedural protections than were provided; every defendant will claim that
the interest was only so important as to require precisely the procedural protections
that were afforded, no less of course but certainly no more. Without a correct
moral theory, or a theory on which we can agree, this dispute is irresoluble. Second,
the rise of the welfare state has made apparent what was always true: that social
arrangements are, at least within limits so broad as to be irrelevant here, artificial
and not natural. It is hard to understand the sense in which a recipient of public
assistance has a natural right to that assistance, given that the welfare system is
so patently artificial. 35 To put it only slightly differently, it is less likely that the
proper moral response to Kelly's loss of benefits is providing a trial-type hearing
than that the proper response is redistributing wealth so that people do not fall
into Kelly's plight in the first place.
Finally, the natural law approach does not capture the distinction between old
and new property. Because the benefits of the welfare state are not material stuff,
we have to develop analogies to old property. But old property is so various that
every benefit is as analogous to old property as any other. On the one hand, things
like public assistance are as important today as property in land used to be to its
beneficiaries. On the other, old forms of property-incorporeal hereditaments such
as property rights in specific ministries, 36 for example-perhaps used to be important,
just as civil service jobs are, but would now seem so trivial that even trivial benefits
do today what incorporeal hereditaments used to do. The effect of this two-fold
attack is either to put old property up for grabs or to convert every benefit of
the welfare state into new property. This, of course, repudiates the effort in Roth
to place limits on the new property.
C.

The Analysis of Liberties

What of limits on the "new liberty"? The due process clauses apply to liberty
as well as property. Is liberty protected only by positive law too? The answer is
a qualified no. Consider Santosky v. Kramer, where the Court held that the Constitution required a state, in its process for terminating the rights of parents to
control the upbringing of their children, to establish the .grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence
as state law allowed." The Court did not worry about the fact that a biological
11The literature on due process tends to ask the question from the other direction: if a state
has no duty under the Constitution to establish a benefit system, how can a potential recipient have
a constitutional right to receive a benefit within that system?
6 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buo'ALo L. REv. 205, 342-45

(1979).

3, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Laycock, supra note 29, at 880, develops a related hypothetical dealing
with "conditional life," that is, a right to life conditioned on the state's use of various procedures

for its deprivation, which procedures might by statute omit proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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parent's rights over his or her children are created by positive law too.3" Instead,
it relied on the Court's "historical recognition that freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest. . . ." A series of cases
involving the rights of prisoners forms a useful contrast to Santosky. In those cases
the Court has held that a prisoner's right to remain in an institution near his home indeed, in one case in Hawaii rather than 3,000 miles away in California - is
protected by due process guarantees only if positive law confers that right,39 and
that a prisoner's expectation that an announced parole date will be honored is protected in a similarly limited way."'
Further, there is a sense in which property is valued because it promotes liberty, by allowing people to pursue their life-plans. 4' To the extent that property
is protected only by positive law, so to is liberty in that respect. For example, in
Paul v. Davis a police chief distributed a list of "active shoplifters" to merchants
around Christmastime .4 Davis' name was on that list, because he had been arrested for shoplifting nearly a year earlier and because the chief had made no effort to determine whether, as was indeed true, the charges had been dropped. The
Court held that Davis could not recover damages for an alleged violation of his
right not to be punished without due process, because his interest was not protected by state law. I find it convenient to think of Paul v. Davis as a ]property
case, in which an old property right - to a reputation that, for example, can be
capitalized in a credit rating - was taken. That, after all, is how Iago wanted
people to think of the matter.4 3 But others prefer to treat the case as involving
44
liberty: the imposition of punishment and the denial to Davis of job opportunities.
Paul v. Davis and the prisoner rights cases may make only limited inroads
on traditionalist and natural- law approaches to liberty. '" The core of liberty, the
right to walk around on the streets as you choose, remains clearer to us than the
" Though the point may perhaps be weaker as to mothers because of their physiological connection to their children, surely my attachments to my children are what they are less because of the biological
relationship to me than because positive law has guaranteed from the outset that if I behave I will
have the right to control their upbringing, within limits themselves defined by positive law. Lehr v.
Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), ought to make this clear. I take it that the use of the possessiveitself a significant word-in connection with the young people who live at the same address as 1 do
makes the point.
" Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
41 Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981).
" See Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 483-84.
42 424 U.S.
693 (1976).
• Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 479 n.97 (lago claims a "natural property" in his reputation).
" See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 428-;9; Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View,
90 HARv. L. Rsv. 293 (1976).
," For example, while it is hornbook law that prisoners have not lost all their rights because
they have been convicted, the substantial restrictions on their liberties that conviction justifies also make
less plausible claims that any particular additional liberty ought to be retained. Compare Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), with Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). On the other
hand, it is also true that, given the substantial restrictions on liberty, the marginal value of additional
liberty to a prisoner will be greater than it would seem to an outsider.
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core of property." It has suffered much less conceptual attack with the rise of
the welfare state. But in the remainder of this Article, I will rely indiscriminately
on property and liberty cases, for several reasons. First, the prisoner rights cases
involve matters such as transfers between penal institutions, parole, and probation.
Instead of abolute deprivations of liberty, they are conditional ones, both analogous
and products of the Progressive impulses
to conditional rights to public assistance
47
that also generated the welfare state.
Second, and related, these forms of conditional liberty are models for other
ways in which the welfare state erodes traditional liberties. For example, Wyman
v. James held that a social worker need not obtain a search warrant before visiting
the home of a recipient of public assistance." Such a visit was not a search, in
part because the social worker's purpose was to determine whether children were
being treated well and in part because it was fair to condition public assistance
on relinquishing some privacy. In other cases the Court has held that government
agents need no warrants to search the premises of highly regulated businesses such
as liquor sales, gun sales, and mining. 9 These cases show that the welfare state
can operate in ways that implicate traditional or core liberties, and that the doctrinal tools to exert pressure on core liberties are as available here as were similar
tools in the case of core property. I suspect that the tools have not been employed
in liberty cases primarily because of the political power of those most protected
by core liberties. Seen in this way, the positive law approach to liberty can be used
state. Paul v. Davis
to explore the Court's vision of the Constitution in the welfare
5
and the prisoner rights cases may foreshadow the future. 1

IV.

WHEN DOES THE CONSTITUTION APPLY?: PRAGMATICS

I have argued that Roth left the law regarding when process was due in conceptual disarray. Not surprisingly, though, the Court has chugged along making
decisions in the area every year. These decisions appear to be quite arbitrary within
the express terms of the analysis, as indeed they must be so long as one takes those
terms as the only relevant ones. But I will offer a different perspective on the cases
which, I believe, begins to make sense of them."
46 Warren, New "Liberty" Under the FourteenthAmendment, 39 HAuv. L. REV. 431 (1926);
Monaghan, supra note 2, at 411-12.

"7

See, e.g., D. RonmAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980).

4- 400

U.S. 309 (1971).
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
"' Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 487-90, argues that freedom from arbitrary procedures ought
to be regarded as a liberty protected by the due process clause. Smolla, supra note 10, at 98 n.108,
and Williams, Liberty & Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (1983),
effectively point out the syntactical difficulties in that position: it amounts to saying that the government shall not deprive people of their freedom from arbitrary procedures ("liberty") without giving
them fair procedures ("due process"). See also Laycock, supra note 29, at 878 n.15.
11 It does not make sense of them all. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Kraft,
436 U.S. 1 (1978).
"
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The Constitution and Rationalized Bureaucracies

One way of looking at the cases is this: When the Court wants to impose procedural requirements, it finds entitlements in positive law and natural law guarantees
of liberty or property; when it does not want to impose such requirements, it finds
no entitlements and ignores natural law arguments for liberty and property in the
circumstances. In this perspective the interesting question becomes, when does the
Court want to impose procedural requirements.5 2 The answer, I think, is that it
does so when it is dealing with rationalized or - less significantly in this setting
-professionalized bureaucracies. If that is correct, the Court's view is that the
Constitution regulates modern bureaucracies but not old-fashioned ones. As we
will see, there are collateral doctrines that ameliorate the apparent perverseness
of the incentives that this view gives decision-makers.
Two years after Roth, the Court decided Wolff v. McDonnell.3 Prisoners in
Nebraska had been disciplined for violating prison rules, and as a result lost "good
time credit" that would have reduced the time they had to serve in prison. By
written regulations adopted by prison authorities, good time credits could be revoked
only for serious misconduct. The prisoners claimed that the procedures for determining whether they had engaged in serious misconduct were inadequate. En route
to agreeing with most of the prisoners' claims, the Court had to face the Roth
question. It held that the prisoners had a liberty interest in good time credit, for
two reasons. The State had "specifie[d] that [good time] is to be forfeited only
for serious misconduct," and the prisoners' interest in shortening their sentences
"had real substance." Thus, although "the liberty itself is a statutory creation of
the State," due process was required in determining whether serious misconduct
had occurred. Though the Court emphasized the State's creation of the interest
in its positive law, the close relation between good time credit and the traditional
liberty to walk the street allowed the Court to juxtapose the positive and natural
law approaches.
The juxtaposition was even clearer in two later cases. High-school students
in Goss v. Lopez were temporarily suspended for participating in various incidents
of misconduct, most of which occurred during or as a result of student
demonstrations. 4 They claimed that the procedures leading to suspension were in" The positive law approach does have independent force, however, in cases where as a matter
of state law, entitlements are (more or less) clearly created. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S.
1 (1979). Yet the rhetoric of Greenholtz betrays a reluctance to find state law entitlements. See id.,
at 9-11. Compare Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), and Olim v. Wakinekona, 103 S. Ct. 1741
(1983), in which the Court declined to interpret state law to create entitlements. Early comments on
Bishop treated it as adopting the positivist approach, see, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 442-43.
But the Court has instead treated it as relying on the trial court's bizarre interpretation of state law.
It has therefore become a sport.
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
" 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See Zimring & Solomon, "The Principle of the Thing: Goss v. Lopez,
Students' Rights and Litigation in the Interest of Children," (unpublished manuscript 1981) for an
interesting discussion of the background of the litigation.
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adequate, and the Court agreed. It found a "legitimate claim of entitlement to
a public education" in the provisions of state law establishing a public school system
and requiring young people to attend schools. In addition, it found a liberty interest in avoiding "damage [to] the students' standing with their fellow pupils and
their teachers as well as interfere[nce] with later opportunities for higher education
and employment" ' ' if the charges of misconduct were sustained. It is important
for my theme to note that the Court held that temporary suspensions must be preceded by "oral or written notice of the charges

. .

. [and] an explanation of the

evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present [the student's] side
of the story.""' It suggested that in most cases it would be enough that "the
disciplinarian.. . informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes
after it has occurred." 5 7 It treated these requirements as "if anything, less than
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair
suspensions." 8
Finally, Vitek v. Jones involved the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to
a state mental institution.5 9 The prisoner had been convicted of robbery; shortly
after he arrived at the prison, he set his mattress on fire, and prison officials, regarding him as suicidal, transferred him to a mental hospital. The Court found that
State statutes created a liberty interest in remaining in a prison when they identified
specific grounds for transfer to a mental hospital: the State "grant[ed] ...

a right

or expectation that adverse action will not be taken against him except upon the
occurrence of specified behavior .... -60 In addition, there was a liberty interest that
even prisoners had in avoiding the further stigma that is imposed by being labelled
mentally ill.
The prisoner rights cases mentioned above provide an important contrast to
these three cases. In Meachum v. Fano the Court held that the due process clause
was inapplicable in cases involving transfers of prisoners from less-restrictive to
more-restrictive institutions "absent a state law . . conditioning such transfers
on proof of serious misconduct .... -""The Court relied on Roth to reject the claim
that the "change in conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact
on the prisoner" was a "grievous loss" that standing alone gave rise to a liberty
interest. This was because the prisoner's conviction authorized the state "to confine him in any of its prisons. ' 62 Only if state law limited the discretion of prison
officials to transfer prisoners would due process be required. Meachum was followed
in OHm v. Wakinekona, where the court held the due process clause inapplicable
in a transfer from Hawaii to a mainland prison.53 The Court in neither case thought
56

419 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 581.

"

IId. at 582.
Id. at 565.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).

6I

Id. at 490-91.

"

6, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
65 Id. at 224.
" 103 S. Ct. 1741.
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the prisoner's interest in remaining near family and friends sufficient under a natural
law approach to make the due process clause applicable.
The counterpoints to Wolff v. McDonnell are Connecticut Board of Pardons
v. Dumschat" and Jago v. Van Curen." Dumschat was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. Under state law he was entitled to request a commutation of
his sentence in order to accelerate his eligibility for parole. Over three-quarters
of the prisoners with life sentences who sought commutations received them, and
were promptly paroled. Dumschat argued that this practice created a Roth-type
"claim of entitlement" to commutation and therefore required the Board to give
him a statement of its reasons for refusing to commute his sentence. The Court
held that the practice was not wide-spread enough to create an entitlement under
positive law. In Van Curen the prisoner had received a notice that he would be
paroled on April 23. When the parole officials learned that he had lied to them
in an interview, they revoked his parole date. The Court held that due process
was not required: the officials had complete discretion to set a parole date and
were therefore not required by state law to make any specific findings of fact. Again
in neither case did the Court find a natural law liberty implicated in an official
decision that severely disrupted the plans the prisoners had begun to make based
on widespread practice or specific information regarding the time when they were
likely to be released.
It would not have been difficult in the prisoner rights cases to find natural
law liberties. Nor would it have been difficult to interpret state law to create positive
law entitlements; the statutes interpreted in Goss v. Lopez to create entitlements
were no more directly relevant to the issue of entitlement than were the statutes
creating a system of parole in Van Curen."6 On the other side, the Court could
easily have interpreted the statutes in Vitek to commit to their discretion the decision about whether information available to officials regarding a prisoner's mental
health justified a transfer to a mental hospital. That is only to drive home the
point that neither Roth nor the alternatives are analytically dispositive. What does
distinguish the sets of cases is that the Court holds the due process clauses applicable
where it views decision-makers as constrained by rule or professional norms,6 ' and
452 U.S. 458 (1981).
454 U.S. 14 (1981).
66 A popular reading of the distinction between Meachum and Vitek makes dispositive the presence
of "specified grounds" in the latter. See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (summary suspension
of driver's license for accumulating points based on traffic offenses, as specified in administrative rules,
is constitutional). The idea is that hearings are useful to determine facts, but if the authorities need
not make any factual determinations before acting, hearings are pointless. This reading is flawed in
two ways. First, a presentation at a hearing may affect the way a decision-maker exercises discretion.
See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-88 (1973). See Michelman, Formal andAssociational
Aims in ProceduralDue Process, 18 NoMos: DuE PROCESS 126, 130, 143 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds., 1977); Smolla, supra note 10, at 105. Second, every system of state law and administrative regulations contains enough leeway for the courts to find a "specific grounds" requirement if they want to.
6 Sometimes the categories collapse into one, as in Vitek, involving doctors in rule-governed
bureaucracies, and Goss, involving professional principals.
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holds it inapplicable where it views decision-makers as unconstrained. Yet all
bureaucracies are to varying degrees politicized, rationalized, and professional. In
some cases the Court emphasizes one rather than another facet of the bureaucracy,
and in other cases it reverses the emphasis: Parole decisions are rationalized (Wolff),
but not always (Van Curen); prisons are professionalized (Vitek) in some of their
operations (Meachum). But what matters is that it is the idea of bureaucracy to
which the Court is reacting.
B.

Rules Without Rights: An Excursus Into Criminal Procedure

In the cases I have discussed so far, the internal regulatory methods by which
superiors control the discretion of subordinates give rise to rights held by persons
outside the bureaucracy. A series of cases in criminal procedure also makes the
existence of rules as a method of hierarchical control relevant to the decision of
constitutional issues. But whereas rules give rise to rights that the courts enforce
in the due process area, they insulate police agencies from external control in the
criminal procedure area. I will suggest in the next sections that the Court's vision,
as expressed in a broad range of cases, is indeed of self-contained bureaucracies
governed by internal rules and internalized professional norms. That is, the central
constitutional issue concerns the internal operation of bureaucracies, not the relation between street-level officials and beneficiaries and clients. In effect the Court
sees hierarchical control within the police agency as an alternative to hierarchical
control by an external agency-by magistrates through the warrant system.
The criminal procedure cases deal with searches. The hornbook law is that
subject to a limited number of exceptions, the police must obtain a warrant before
they conduct a search. Some recent cases, invoking narrow exceptions, suggest a
broader principle that no warrant is needed when the search is conducted pursuant
to routine procedures whose effect is to place bounds on the discretion otherwise
available to police officers. In South Dakota v. Opperman, the police towed
Opperman's car to the police station after finding it parked in a no-parking zone,
and then conducted what was called a routine inventory search to determine what
was in the car. 6 The bureaucratic rationale for inventory searches is that they protect the police against claims that some valuable object was stolen while the car
was in police custody, that they allow the police to determine what actions are
appropriate to protect the car from vandalism, and that they assure superiors that
subordinates have no temptation to remove items from the car. The inventory search
in Opperman disclosed drugs in the glove compartment. Opperman sought to have
the drugs excluded from use against him. Earlier exceptions to the warrant requirement allowed police officers to search cars as incident to an arrest, on the theory
that the arrestee might have access to weapons or might be able to destroy evidence,
and, where the police had probable cause to believe that there was evidence in the
car, to delay the search until the car had been secured at the police station. 6 These
6S 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
69

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); United

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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exceptions were inapplicable in Opperman: Opperman
when the search occurred, and the police had no reason
in the car. Nor would it have been extremely difficult
relatively brief period needed to obtain a warrant. Thus,
search was "routine" was dispositive.70

[Vol. 86

had no access to the car
to believe that drugs were
to secure the car for the
the fact that the inventory

In another line of cases the Court has considered a variety of efforts by police
agencies to detect crimes that occur intermittently over a large area and for what
amount to long periods: drunk driving, importation of undocumented aliens, and
drug-smuggling. The Court has held unconstitutional random stops of drivers for
breath tests, 7 ' and "roving check-points" at which officers stop some drivers who
pass the point the officers have chosen." It has permitted stops at fixed
check-points73 and has strongly hinted that roadblocks could be established to screen
all drivers for sobriety. 7' Although the cases can be reconciled in a number of ways,
the discussion so far should make one of them obvious. The pairs of situations
differ in the location of the authority to institute the stop. Line officers decide
which cars to stop at random and which drivers to stop at roving check-points
whose location they have chosen. In contrast, superior officers decide where to
place a fixed checkpoint, and, in view of the public attention a sobriety roadblock
will inevitably attract and considering their broader view of where drunk drivers
are likely to be found, are likely to decide where to put up the roadblocks.
I have mentioned the cases allowing warrantless searches of places where heavilyregulated businesses are conducted. If the businesses are not heavily regulated, but
are still subject to limited regulations - fire codes or occupational safety laws then warrants are required. 7- Recognizing that these laws can be enforced effectively only if the enforcement agency is able to make spot-checks, the Court has suggested that the agency could use special kinds of warrants. It could establish a
program of inspecting business places in industries where the rate of accidental
injury is highest, and so on. That is, the warrant would be issued not on the ground
that there was probable cause to believe that the law had been violated but on
the ground that the enforcement agency had a set of rules saying, in effect, that
it was time for the place to be inspected. Notice that such rules, whatever their
effect on business, allow superiors to check on the work of enforcers at the street
level: they are, or at least can be used as, production quotas or measures for
inspectors.

70

The role of routine is confirmed by Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983), where the

Court found constitutional an inventory search of a backpack. Obviously the car search cases were
not directly relevant, and securing the backpack unopened would have been simple. For a general discussion
of inventory searches, see United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
72 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
'" United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
", Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
" See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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Rules that routinize police behavior but do not confer rights are also found
in the law of search incident to arrest. Chimel v. Californiarationalized prior law
in holding that, in the course of arresting a person, the police could search only
the area in his or her immediate control: Such searches were justified on the ground
that the arrestee might destroy evidence or grab a weapon to assault the police,
which he or she can do only within a limited area; the justification does not extend
to other areas, searches of which require warrants.76 In United States v. Robinson
the police arrested Robinson for a traffic offense." Given his record, the offense
required that he be taken to the police station. Departmental rules stated that, when
they made such "custodial" arrests, the police should conduct a full search of the
arrestee's person. In the course of that search the police found a crumpled cigarette
package which they opened. In it were drugs. Robinson sought to suppress the
drugs in his subsequent trial for possessing them, arguing that the full search and
opening the package were not justified by the reasons for searches incident to arrest: There was no evidence of the traffic offense to be destroyed, and whatever
threat might be concealed in the package - a razor blade is about all it could
have been - could have been eliminated by seizing but not opening the package.
Some observers hoped that the Court would uphold the search because it was
specifically authorized by departmental rules,7 8 but the Court went off on different
grounds. 79 It argued that police officers face a wide variety of situations in conducting arrests. They cannot be expected to think through a complicated set of rules
by asking themselves, for example, whether the arrestee has access to evidence that
might be destroyed or whether this package, wallet, or bag might contain a weapon.
Rather, they need clear rules that can be adopted as part of a relatively simple
routine: "if it's a custodial arrest, I can conduct a full search." 8 The Court later
extended its preference for simple rules to cases involving searches of cars incident
to arrest: The police can search the entire passenger compartment of a car incident
to the arrest of a person in it, even if the person no longer had access to the contents of the car.'
In these "search incident to arrest" cases, the Court is not of course ratifying
decisions made according to rules developed by police or enforcement agencies,
as it is in Opperman and the business regulation cases. But it is acting on an image
of police officers as the kind of people who need guidance by clear and simple
rules. Those rules, whether developed internally or externally, form a system of
regulating the exercise of discretion analogous in some ways to systems of utilitarian

76

395 U.S. 752 (1969).

414 U.S. 218 (1973).
, See LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication" versus "StandardizedProcedures" The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127; White, The FourthAmendment As a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165.
," See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (upholding a similar search where no depart-

mental rules were involved).
So

"

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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generalization which take as the model of a moral system a set of rules simple
enough to learn that will promote utility better than any other system equally or
more simple. As we will see, the resemblance to utilitarianism may be significant.
For now it is useful to contrast the Court's preference for rules in this context
with its preference for standards in another context involving searches.
Occasionally the police do try to get search warrants. They go to a magistrate
- usually a judge but not necessarily - and swear that they have certain information. If that information amounts to probable cause to believe that evidence is at
the place the police want to search, the magistrate issues the warrant. The crucial
step is the magistrate's evaluation of the information presented by the police.
Sometimes the police rely on facts given to them by an outside informant. Over
the years a complex set of rules developed to guide the evaluation of police statements
relying on informants: The police had to give the magistrate enough information
to allow him or her to evaluate the credibility of the informant - for example,
that the informant had given information that had proved true in the past - and
to evaluate the basis on which the informant rested the information-for example,
that the informant had seen drugs at the location described. Further, some deficiencies in the informant's statements could be made up if the police said that they
had confirmed the accuracy of some parts, even innocent details, of what the informant had told them. In Illinois v. Gates the Court did away with this elaborate
rule structure. 8" The detailed rules, it said, should do no more than point out to
magistrates some things they should think about before issuing warrants. Their
decisions should be guided not by rules at all but by a general standard of
reasonableness: Given what you know, the Court said to magistrates, decide whether
as a common sense matter it is reasonable to think that the evidence is where the
police want to search. It further emphasized the deference appellate courts should
give to the magistrate's initial determination of probable cause.
Rules and standards are alternative ways of regulating the activities of street
level bureaucrats such as police officers and magistrates. The pattern here treats
the police as a rationalized bureaucracy in which superiors have to control relatively unsophisticated line officers through relatively crude rules, and the judiciary as
a professionalized bureaucracy in which superiors can trust subordinates to exercise discretion appropriately because they all share a common ethos. Gates announces
the Court's new understanding that magistrates are enough like judges to make
it appropriate to subject them to control by professional norms, rather than by
rules whose use would be appropriate if magistrates were really like police officers.
Of course this pattern may be an artifact. The majority of the present Court
does not like to restrict the activities of the police in conducting searches or in
much else. It may simply be using whatever tools are within easy reach to validate
what the police have done in the cases before the Court. And yet I suggest that
the pattern here can be seen as part of a patchwork of doctrines from a large number
"2 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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of areas whose design is built upon the Court's preference for rationalized and
professional bureaucracies.
C. Avoiding Perverse Incentives
If the Court has that preference, the criminal procedure cases make some sense.
But the due process cases seem strange. They say to the politicized bureaucracy
that its activities will be free of constitutional restraints, and to the partially
rationalized or professional one that because it has taken a few steps in adopting
substantive rules, the Constitution forces it to go further and provide more procedures than it had adopted. This would seem to create an incentive not to adopt
substantive rules, which in light of the preference I have attributed to the Court
seems perverse. 2 - There are a number of reasons why the perversity may only be
apparent.
First, it may well be that the process of modernizing bureaucracies - rationalizing or professionalizing them - is pushed by such strong forces that positive law
creates legitimate claims of entitlement in all but minor backwaters of the welfare
state. I should emphasize here that the rules that create such claims often serve
the interests not alone of recipients but of superiors in the bureaucracies who want
to control their subordinates.83 Second, as I will argue in the next section, if the
process of modernization goes far enough, the Court will ratify the procedures
adopted by a fully modernized bureaucracy by holding that, though process was
due under Roth, the process provided was all that the Constitution required.
Third, even old-fashioned bureaucracies must comply with the substantive
provisions of the Constitution. But the Court has gone further and has held that
when such bureaucracies violate the Constitution they may be required to do more
than modernized ones must do to make up for their deficiencies. Hutto v. Finney
was a late stage in protracted litigation challenging as "cruel and unusual punishment" the dreadful conditions in the Arkansas prison system.84 The trial court had
directed that various changes be made in the system. The Supreme Court had before
it only one part of that comprehensive order, a direction that no prisoner serve
longer than 30 days in punitive confinement. The Court recognized that 30 days
was not an unusually long period for punitive confinement in the abstract. But
it expressly stated that the remedial order was appropriate in the context of the
82.

See Lucas v. Hodges, No. 83-1099 (D.C. Cir. March 23, 1984) (Starr, J., dissenting in part).

S It seems to me significant that immediately after the Roth decision the Regents of the Univer-

sity of Wisconsin adopted a detailed code establishing numerous procedures for notice and administrative
review of decisions not to renew contracts. They did so not because the Constitution required them
to, but because the University had grown so large that rationalization of employment procedures was
necessary if the University was to operate smoothly, and because the professoriate at the University
was disturbed at the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Regents' claim that they were free to act
arbitrarily. The desire to rationalize employment procedures also lies behind the willingness of sophisticated
university administrators to deal with faculty unions. Cf. Stone, The Post-War Paradigmin American
Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
8- 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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Arkansas case, precisely because the system was so terrible before the courts acted.
We might test the implications of Hutto by comparing Arkansas and a hypothetical
neighboring state. In Arkansas prisoners cannot be placed in punitive confinement
for more than 30 days. In the neighboring state prisons are minimally decent, and
have a rule allowing 60 or 90 days in punitive confinement. Hutto implies that
a challenge to that rule would fail. Prison administrators in the neighboring state
can therefore do things that those in Arkansas cannot. That occurs solely because
the Arkansas bureaucrats had not exercised sufficient control over their prisons.
Hutto thus provides incentives to modernize in order to have the freedom accorded
administrators of modern prisons but denied those of retrograde ones. 81
Finally, there are two important doctrinal devices that provide incentives to
modernize. The first gives incentives to depoliticize the bureaucracy, the second
incentives to rationalize it.
During the 1820s and 1830s Andrew Jackson and his political allies created
the American spoils system, in which government jobs down to the lowest level
were given to political supporters of those in power.86 After the Civil War, middle
class reformers, concerned in part over the inefficiency of the spoils system and
in part over the fact that new political forces dominated by immigrants had taken
over the system, fought to establish a professional civil service. Government jobs
were to be allocated on the basis of merit, and civil servants would be protected
against dismissal on the basis of their political affiliations. Almost a century later
the Supreme Court discovered that this program was part of the Constitution. In
Elrod v. Burns the newly elected Republican Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,
dismissed a number of deputies because they were Democrats.8" A divided Supreme
Court held that such patronage dismissals violated the first amendment: Political
affiliation could not be used as a ground for governmental action of that sort.
It could justify patronage dismissals of policy-making bureaucrats, though that
class might be narrowly defined,88 but not of ordinary street level bureaucrats. The
Court suggested that political affiliation might be a permissible basis for initial
appointment to a street level position, which of course gives those temporarily in
power an incentive to create new bureaucracies. But Elrod removes adherence to
85 In addition, judges developing plans to remedy unconstitutional conditions are likely to look
to professional standards such as those developed by the American Correctional Association. Such standards provide ready-made criteria in areas with which the judges may not be familiar. Hutto and related lower-court cases, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1980); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), imply that it is within the
trial court's discretion to require that those standards be met. Yet failing to meet any individual standard does not itself violate the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 158-59 infra.
"6 L. MEuALm, PUBLIC SERVICE & SPECIAL TRAINING: FOUR PUBLIC LECTURES (1936); C. PRINCE,
THE FEDERALISTS & THrE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE (1977); A. HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE
SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIWL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT (1968); M. MARSTEIN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE: AN INTRODUCTION To BUREACRACY (1957).
"

427 U.S. 347 (1976).

See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1979).
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a common political program as a mechanism by which superiors can control the
89
exercise of discretion by subordinates in an established bureaucracy. As soon as
the "outs" displace the "ins," other methods of control - rules or professional
norms - will have to be developed. And indeed it is probably significant that Elrod
arose in Cook County, where the dominance of a single party had prevented that
displacement for many years; elsewhere the rotation of "ins" and "outs" probably made it almost essential to depoliticize the bureaucracy so that it could operate

smoothly during and after political transitions.
The "ins" in superior positions might be uncomfortable even with Elrod's
limited concession to political appointments, for they have no guarantee that their
appointees will continue to adhere to what might well be a political program that

changes as different factions displace each other. Elrod depoliticizes decisions to
fire street level bureaucrats. It would be well, from the point of view of superiors,

to depoliticize the daily operation of the bureaucracy too. This is done through
statutes like the Hatch Act, which severely limit the kinds of political activity in
which street level bureaucrats can engage. Under the Hatch Act and its state counter-

parts, such bureaucrats cannot hold party office, raise money for parties, or run
for office under a party label. The Supreme Court has held that these restrictions

on political activity do not violate the first amendment rights of street level
bureaucrats.

90

Its rhetoric suggests that the restrictions are not only permissible

but are also wise and sensible attempts to depoliticize the bureaucracy:
[The decision] confirm[s] the judgment of history.. .that it is in the best interest
of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious
performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of federal
9
employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited. '
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch
of the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer
the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with
their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law
and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or
against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of
the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan
political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding
92
activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.

19 It also removes a more obvious but less interesting mechanism of control: removal pursuant
to the unchecked discretion of a superior. The threat of a lawsuit based on a claim that the removal
was motivated by impermissible political concerns will induce superiors to develop a more rule-oriented
system.
90 Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 564.
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A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further
serve the goal that employment and advancement in the Government service not
depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation
to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with
their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. 3
Taken together, Elrod and the Hatch Act cases give bureaucratic superiors good
reasons to try to regulate the behavior of subordinates by rules and professional
norms."' They thereby offset to some extent the pressure Roth exerts in the opposite
direction.
If the civil service cases provide incentives to depoliticize bureaucracies, another
set provides incentives to regularize their operations. A federal civil rights statute
says that people whose constitutional rights have been taken from them by state
officials may recover money damages from those officials. As the Supreme Court
has developed the law of damages, two elements make it sensible for officials to
follow routines. First, individual bureaucrats will have to pay damages only if they
did not act in good faith.9 5 "Good faith" is defined as a reasonable belief that
the actions were constitutional. A bureaucrat would be well-positioned to assert
the good faith defense if he or she had acted in accordance with pre-established
rules, especially if those rules had been cleared with legal counsel to the agency."
Second, a person whose rights were violated must show that the violation had caused
his or her injuries. For example, Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle involved
a teacher who had been fired. 7 The teacher was a union activist who had criticized
the school board quite vociferously. But there also was evidence that he physically
abused some students and disobeyed reasonable orders given him by his principal.
The Court held that he could recover damages for the firing if he showed that
his union activities, protected by the first amendment, had been one reason for
the firing, but that the school board would win if it showed that he would have
been fired anyway because of his disruptive behavior. In the latter instance, the
violation of rights would not have caused any injury. This rule of causation gives
bureaucrats reasons to develop "paper trails" that will allow them to establish the
"it would have happened anyway" defense.' An important part of a paper trail
Id. at 566.
Under Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1978), subordinates can complain both inside and outside the bureaucracy
about their superiors' substantive policies. But apparently the Constitution does not require that they
be allowed to complain about personnel policies or to organize co-workers to oppose the superiors.
See Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). That is, subordinates cannot engage in "office politics,"
thus giving their superiors an even stronger hand in their control.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
96 Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the city or agency-that is, the taxpayers-might be liable to pay
damages for adopting unconstitutional rules. Such liability indirectly affects bureauracts' incentives to
adopt better rules to the extent that they fear the consequences of a taxpayer revolt.
97429 U.S. 274 (1977).
'3

"
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will be a set of procedures that the bureaucrat followed before acting. Further,
the defense will be easier to establish if the bureaucrats have at hand a set of
previously developed substantive standards against which the subordinate's performance can be measured.
The Supreme Court undoubtedly does not think of these various rules as providing incentives to depoliticize, rationalize, and professionalize the bureaucracies
of the welfare state. Nor is it important for my argument to establish that
bureaucracies respond to these, or any other, incentives. Rather, these rules help
fill in the patch-work that is the Court's vision of the welfare state bureaucracy.
In that vision, the Constitution does not disrupt the operation of bureaucracy, and
may even facilitate it, because bureaucracy is already depoliticized and rationalized
or professionalized.
What Process Is Due?

D.

Goldberg v. Kelly9" decided two issues. It held that due process was required
when a state sought to terminate public assistance payments, and it defined the
process that was due. The state in Goldberg had a formal system of appeals, where
the beneficiary could present oral evidence and cross-examine witnesses, that could
be taken after assistance payments were ended. The issue in Goldberg was therefore what the state had to do before ending the payments. Under state law the
recipient was given notice of the reasons for termination at least seven days before
the payments were to end, and could submit a written statement about why the
payments should continue. Although the Supreme Court said that "the pre99
termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial,"
it actually imposed almost all of the characteristics of such trials. The hearing did
not have to produce "a complete record and comprehensive opinion,'"" but the
beneficiary had to have "an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any
'1
adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally,'
with the assistance of an attorney "if he so desires,"' 102 and the impartial decisionmaker should state the reasons for the decision. 1 3 Just as the notion of new property rested on an appeal to tradition in defining what interests are important, so
here the Court reverted to the only model at hand, the traditional judicial trial,
to define the characteristics of the process that was due.
The traditional trial provided a checklist that the Court could work through
in any new property situation. Thus, in Morrissey v. Brewer the Court considered
the procedures required to revoke parole. It analogized the preliminary decision
to the pre-termination hearing in Goldberg, and required a decision "by someone
9- 397 U.S. 254 (1977).
91397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
'oo

Id. at 267.

Id. at 268.
"0,Id.

"

at 270.

Id. at 271.
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not directly involved in the case,"'' 0 4 notice, and the opportunity to appear in person and present evidence.' 0° At the revocation hearing itself, more elaborate procedures were required. Again the two-step of disclaiming reliance on the judicial
trial and then requiring it occurred:
We cannot write a code of procedure.... Our task is limited to deciding the minimum
requirements of due process. They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize
that there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal
prosecution in any sense.' 6
In both Goldberg and Morrissey the Court said that it was reluctant to require
judicial trials because, as the latter put it, "creat[ing] an inflexible structure... [would]
impose a great burden" on the state's new property and liberty systems. That is
precisely the motivation that led to the adoption of Roth's entitlement theory. And
just as Roth limited the scope of the due process clause out of concern for stifling
the development of new property systems, so Goldberg's reliance on the judicial
trial as a model succumbed to pressures arising from the same concerns. As the
Court put it in Parham v. J.R.:
As the scope of governmental action expands into new areas creating new controversies for judicial review, it is incumbent on courts to design procedures that
protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts
of the states to deal with difficult social problems. The judicial model for factfinding for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their nature, can
turn rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise.' 7
These pressures led to Mathews v. Eldridge.10 Eldridge received disability
benefits from the Social Security system. In 1972 he filled out a questionnaire regarding his present medical condition. On receiving Eldridge's answers, the agency administering the benefits obtained reports from his doctor and from a psychiatric
consultant. This information led the agency to decide that Eldridge was no longer
disabled. It notified him of its proposed termination of benefits, which he disputed
in a letter. The agency then made the termination of benefits final. Eldridge
challenged the agency's procedures, claiming that Goldberg required a pretermina"o

10,
"0'

408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).
Id. at 485-87.
Id. at 488-89.

"'
442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979).
,OS424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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tion evidentiary hearing. In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court
distinguished Goldberg on a number of grounds: Disability benefits are not based
on need, and their termination would therefore not drive former recipients over
the edge of subsistence-level income; disability decisions are based primarily on
medical evidence usually contained in written materials not subject to serious
challenges to credibility that in-person presentation and cross-examination can expose. Eldridge repeatedly deprecated Goldberg as the "only" new property case
relying on the trial model. 9 It adopted as an alternative the following test:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
In applying this test, the Court first described "the elaborate character of the
[existing] administrative procedures.""' The private interest was not, as in Goldberg,
avoiding destitution. Given the statutory standards, Eldridge was - at least according to the agency -able to work, but even if the agency was wrong, Eldridge could
rely on "private resources [and] other forms of government assistance" if the family
fell below the subsistence level." ' The private interest, "in view of these potential
sources of temporary income," was not enough to justify "depart[ing] from the
ordinary principle.. .that something less than an evidentiary hearing is
3
" I,,
The existing procedures allowed for careful evaluation of the medical
sufficient ....
evidence, "a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement," which the Court said - without explaining
why - would utilize "a wide variety of information." I" The Court also deprecated
the significance of the high rate of reversal of decisions to terminate disability
benefits: "Bare statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of
a decision-making process,""' and were especially suspect here because reversals
could be based, not on errors at the initial stage, but on new evidence." 6
Eldridge adopts an explicitly utilitarian test of due process." 7 I will return to
the widely made suggestion that the test is defective because it ignores values other
,0'
Id. at 333, 340.
"o Id. at 335.
Id. at 339.
'Id.
at 342.
" Id. at 343.
Id.
114

Id. at 346.
Id. at 346-37.

See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 122; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for AdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw, Three Factors].
"'
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than utility. For now I want to emphasize two things. First, the utilitarian test
is entirely consistent with the essentially technocratic vision of bureaucracies that,
I have argued, the Court holds. Second, the traditional model of the judicial trial
provided the Court with some guidance in deciding what process was due. One
would begin with that model and ask whether particular departures were justified
by the circumstances. For example, the Court held that the right to confront adverse
witnesses could be limited in prison disciplinary hearings where there was reason
to think that the witnesses might be physically harmed by retaliation. " 6 In contrast
the utilitarian approach gives the Court no such guidance.' '9 As my discussion of
Eldridge suggests, the Court is then driven to seat-of-the-robes assessments
of the way the world operates and would operate if things were different. These
assessments lead in turn to a pair of characteristic judgments: that the professionals
making the street level decisions can be trusted, and that the professionals in charge
of the system as a whole can be trusted to adopt procedures that the courts should
acknowledge as all the Constitution requires.
Heckler v. Campbell illustrates the latter point.' 0 The Social Security Administration operates the federal disability system. Under that system people are
defined as disabled if they have medical or physical impairments that make them
unable to perform substantial gainful work "which exists in the national
economy."' 2 The Administration processes an enormous number of claims. Prior
to 1978 it relied on evidence introduced at hearings to determine whether work
existed in the national economy for people with the disabilities the claimants had.
"Although this testimony often was based on standardized guides.... vocational experts frequently were criticized for their inconsistent treatment of similarly situated
claimaints."' 2 In 1978 the Administration replaced the use of testimony with a set
of guidelines in the form of a grid. After identifying the claimant's disability, age,
education and work experience, the administrative law judge consults the relevant
box in the grid to find out whether there are jobs in the national economy for
such a person. The Supreme Court upheld the grid as a reasonable form of rulemaking regarding "general factual issue[s] ''123 The grid introduced uniformity in an
overburdened system, and, notably, rationalized the behavior of administrative law
judges in accordance with expert determinations made at higher levels of the
bureaucracy.
Notably, and consistent with the general theme of this Article, the Court's
judgments play out as deference to professionals in bureaucracies. They are not
expressed, as a general theory of judicial restraint might suggest, as deference to
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Cf. Mashaw, Three Factors, supra note 117, at 55 (analogous problem in justifying departures
from traditional model where there is no guidance as to which traditional procedures are apposite to
the novel problem).
"9

,' 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983).
12, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1976).
12,

103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954.
at 1958.

Id.
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the will of the majority as embodied in the decisions of the representative legislatures
that established the bureaucracies that adopted the procedures in issue. Obviously
the chain between the electorate and the rules is far too long to make a generalized
theory of judicial restraint at all plausible.'14 The imagery of professionalism, not
that of democracy, makes more sense of the situation.
I turn now to examine three areas in which we can see, with varying degrees
of clarity, the link between the utilitarian test of Eldridge and deference to professional judgments.
1. Impartial Decision-makers
As we have seen, Arnett v. Kennedy"2' involved the dismissal of an employee
by the very person he had charged with giving a bribe. Justice Powell rejected the
positive law approach pursued by Justice Rehnquist, but agreed that the dismissal
was constitutional. Anticipating Eldridge'sutilitarian test, Justice Powell balanced
the interests of the government and the employee. He found it easy to conclude
that a Goldberg-type pretermination hearing was not required. In a footnote he
disposed of the problem of partiality by invoking "practical considerations": "In
most cases, the employee's supervisor is the official best informed about the 'cause'
a curious way of characterizing the dispute between Kennedy
for termination" - 26
and his supervisor.
Schweiker v. McClure is more instructive, perhaps because it explicitly used
the Eldridge test.' 2 7 Private insurance companies administer part of the Medicare
system by processing payments received from the government to cover 80% of the
cost of most physician services. If the insurance company refuses to pay part of
a claim - for example because the service was not medically necessary or because
the charge was unreasonable - the patient, who will have to pay out of his or
her own pocket, may appeal to a hearing officer chosen by the insurance company
and paid by the government. Although it agreed that the hearing officers "serve[d]
in a quasi-judicial capacity"'' 2 8 and so had to be impartial, the Supreme Court
"start[ed], however, from the presumption that the hearing officers...are
unbiased."'2 9 That presumption was not overcome by the mere fact that they were
chosen by the insurance companies, because the companies had no financial interest
in the outcome of appeals: Either the government or the patient would pay, but not
the company. This despite the facts that five out of seven of Blue Shield's hearing
" But see Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 118-19. See also Withrow v. Larkin. 421 U.S. 35 (1975)
(upholding power of state examining board to investigate, prosecute and decide cases of professional
misconduct; combination of functions does not violate due process; issue is "substantial" but wide
variety of solutions is necessary given "the incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this
country").

127

416 U.S. 134 (1974).
I26
Id. at 170 n.5.
456 U.S. 188 (1982).

'"

Id.

12

129

Id.

at 195.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 4
1106

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 86

officers were former or current Blue Shield employees, and that another hearing
officer had been employed by the insurance industry for forty-two years. One does
not have to hold a very strong theory about how class interests are formed to believe
that people like that are unlikely to be impartial as between patients and the government, in an era of concern over containing the cost of health care lest escalating
costs threaten the stability of the entire system from which insurance companies
have, perhapsto their surprise, profited handsomely. As we will see again, presumptions like that in McClure rest on assessments of social reality. Here the assessment
is a relatively undifferentiated sense that people in positions of bureaucratic authority
are trustworthy. Later the sense will be refined to take account of professionalism.
2.

Evidence and Cross-Examination

Another disability case, Richardson v. Perales, makes the professionalism of
bureaucratic decision-makers important. 3 ' Perales applied for disability benefits.
After he filed his claim, the agency arranged for an examination by an orthopedic
specialist, whose report, according to the Court, "was devastating from [Perales']
standpoint." The report said that Perales was "obviously holding back" and
"exaggerat[ing] his difficulties." Relying on this report and rejecting evaluations
by Perales' own doctor, the agency denied Perales' claim. When Perales requested
reconsideration, the agency arranged for an examination by a psychiatrist, who
found that Perales had a paranoid personality but was not disabled by a psychiatric
illness. At Perales' request, a hearing was held. The hearing examiner considered
these medical reports over Perales' objection that he had no opportunity to crossexamine the doctors. The examiner called the reports, and others introduced by
Perales, "objective medical evidence" and concluded that Perales was not disabled.
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Supreme Court found that it did not violate
due process to rely on these documents to deny the claim. The Court enumerated
"a number of factors" to support its conclusion. The first was that the reports
were prepared by doctors who examined Perales. Although some of the doctors
were paid by the agency, the Court could not "ascribe bias to the work of these
independent physicians, or any interest on their part in the outcome of the
administrative proceeding beyond the professional curiosity a dedicated medical
man possesses."' 3' Their reports were detailed and rested on standard procedures.
Further, to require oral testimony by the doctors would, in light of the size of
the disability system, "be a substantial drain.. .on the energy of physicians already
3
in short supply."'

129Id.

402 U.S. 389 (1971).
Id. at 403.
,, Id. at 406. See also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (oral hearing required when
claimant requests that recoupment of overpaid benefits should be waived because claimant was not
at fault and recoupment would be "against equity and good conscience").
ISO
"'
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3. Counsel
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services shows how seat-of-the-robes
' Lassiter's son William
judgments of fairness get made. 33
had been placed in foster
care in 1975 after a court found that she had not provided him with proper medical
care. A year later Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder; the death had
occurred during a fight between her mother and the victim, in which Lassiter joined.
While she was in prison, the Department filed a petition to terminate Lassiter's
parental rights because she had not had contact with William since 1975 and had
not tried to strengthen her relationship with him or plan for his future. A hearing
was held, at which the Department was represented by a lawyer and Lassiter was
not. The Department presented one witness, who described Lassister's case by relying on agency records, and repeated comments about Lassiter that her neighbors
had made. The judge offered to allow Lassiter to cross-examine, but Lassiter,
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence, found it impossible to do so. Lassiter and
her mother testified that the latter was willing to raise William. During the hearing
the trial judge was occasionally impatient with Lassiter's labored efforts to show
that she had indeed planned for William's future.
Lassiter claimed that she should have been provided counsel at the termination
hearing. Rejecting that claim, the Court divided its analysis into three steps. First,
it reviewed the precedents on the right to counsel and concluded that an unconditional right existed only if the litigant might lose his or her physical liberty at the
conclusion of the hearing. Second, it evaluated the general class of termination
cases in light of Eldridge and the presumption against a right to counsel. The parent
had a "commanding" interest in retaining parental rights and avoiding criminal
charges predicated on the activity giving rise to the proceeding; the state had an
interest in the child's welfare and so "share[d] the parent's interest in an accurate
and just decision";' 34 the state's interest in keeping costs down by not paying counsel
was legitimate but not very strong; finally, the issues in termination proceedings
were sometimes complex, and often had to be developed through the testimony
of parents "with little education.. .thrust into a distressing and disorienting
situation.' ' 13 Sometimes these interests would come out on balance to favor the
appointment of counsel, but they would not always be "distributed" so that the
balance came out that way. Thus there was no unconditional right to counsel in
termination cases. Rather, the issue was to be decided on a case-by-case basis.' 36
If this analysis is taken seriously, Eldridge eliminates the possibility that the
Constitution requires that any procedures, not just counsel, be provided in an entire class of cases. For it will never be true that the Eldridge factors are distributed
in every case in any class so that the balance inevitably tips in favor of providing

3 452
3,Id.
"' Id.
126 Id.

U.S. 18 (1981).
at 27.
at 30.
at 31-32.
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the procedure at issue. This point is driven home by the rhetorical skill with which
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court avoided the usual trap of balancing tests,
into which Eldridge itself fell, of manipulating the characterization of interests to
determine the result. Instead the opinion gave maximum weight to the parent's
interest and minimized the state's. If an unconditional right cannot be justified
under these circumstances, it never could be.' 37
But the best, from one point of view, was yet to come. The Court's third step
was to analyze whether in the case before it Lassiter should have been provided
counsel. It concluded that "the trial court did not err in failing to appoint
counsel."' 38 The case was procedurally and substantively simple. Hearsay evidence
was admitted, and some arguments were not developed as well as a lawyer might
have developed them. But the arguments would have failed because the contrary
evidence, though controverted, was substantial.' 3 9 Two pointss are worth making
in conclusion. First, by requiring only case-by-case decisions, the Court placed
substantial reliance on the trial courts, just as it did in Illinois v. Gates. Second,
by speaking of the state's interest in child welfare and by treating the social worker's
evidence as substantial, the Court acted on an implicit understanding that child
welfare bureaucracies operate as professional norms say they should.
E.

The Consequences of Utilitarian Balancing in a Technocracy

I do not want to draw this picture too starkly. Of course not every due process
case since Eldridge has relied explicitly on the view of bureaucracies as professionalized, nor has a strong version of that view been implicit in every case. Further,
some of the references to professional norms are undoubtedly a little quirky. For
example, Perales' emphasis on trusting doctors rather obviously stems from Justice
Blackmun's well-known sympathy with doctors, derived from his experience as
counsel to the Mayo Clinic. But the general pattern is clear enough to warrant
identifying it as a significant part of the Court's general view of the world.
That pattern leads to decisions that whatever due process requires, it was provided by the agency. That is not because utilitarian balancing is such a complicated
process as to be beyond the competence of the courts but within the competence
of majoritarian legislatures. Rather, the agency's procedures satisfy due process
because the agency is a professionalized bureaucracy. Notice how these cases combine with the Roth line of cases to yield the conclusion that no procedures are
required beyond those chosen by the agency: Either there is no entitlement and
therefore no right to any additional process, or there is an entitlement protected
by the procedures already provided. If the approach to the problem through positive
law was foregone explicitly, it was followed in another form.

37

"'
"'

See id. at 49-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32-33.
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I will conclude this section by discussing briefly two cases that drive home its
point. The Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER)
objected to the procedures by which New York removed foster children from their
foster families.' 4" Technically the state children's agency had legal custody of foster
children; it contracted with foster parents for day-to-day supervision of the
children. The agency had complete discretion to remove a child from a foster home,
which usually meant transferring the child to another foster home. All the agency
had to do was to give the foster parents ten days notice and an opportunity for
a conference at which they would be advised of the reasons for removal and given
a chance to explain why they believed the child should not be removed. A full
adversary hearing was provided after removal. In addition, foster parents could
petition the Family Court to review the agency's removal decision before it took
effect.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court first struggled with the Roth issue,
which was particularly acute because the foster parents had not received benefits
from the agency in the usual way, but had instead signed contracts into which the
procedural provisions of the statutes could be read as implied terms of the agreement. Yet foster children often stayed with one set of foster parents long enough
to develop the ties of affection expected in biological families, ties which, as Santosky
and Lassiter show, create liberty interests requiring procedural protection. That
indeed posed an additional problem, because the biological parents had liberty interests too, often conflicting with those of foster parents. Justice Brennan found
it unnecessary to resolve the Roth question: assuming that foster parents had protected interests, he concluded that the agency procedures were constitutional under
the Eldridgetest. A footnote stated, "In assessing the likelihood of erroneous decisions by the agency in the absence of elaborate hearing procedures, the fact that
the agency bears primary responsibility for the welfare of the child and maintains,4
through its case-workers, constant contact with the foster family is relevant."' '
The natural parents and children could be excluded from the hearing "since the
will usually be most
foster parents and the agency, through its caseworkers,
4
knowledgeable about conditions in the foster home.'
Finally there is Parhamv. J.R., in which the Court rejected claims that Georgia's
procedures by which parents and state agencies with custody over children committed them "voluntarily" to mental institutions were unconstitutional. 4 3 Under state
law guardians file applications for hospitalization. The child is observed, and if
the superintendent of the hospital decides that the child is mentally ill, the child
may be admitted. Although not required by state statutes, most of the institutions
conducted periodic reviews of each child to determine whether institutionalization
'4

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).

12

Id. at 850 n.58.
Id. at 851.
442 U.S. 584 (1979).

"'
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should continue. The reviews were done by the medical and professional staff; less
frequent reviews were conducted by a different set of staff personnel.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court is replete with references to the
use of "medical knowledge.. .to ameliorate the human tragedies of seriously disturbed
children""' and the like. It applied the Eldridge test. The child had a substantial
liberty interest and a weaker one in avoiding "adverse social consequences" from
being labelled mentally ill: "[W]hat is truly 'stigmatizing' is the symptomatology
of a mental or emotional illness."' 4 5 The parents had a long-recognized interest
in exercising authority over their children: "The law's concept of the family rests
on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity.... [H]istorically
it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children."'" 6 The state's interest was in providing facilities to those
in genuine need without imposing additional procedural barriers that might deter
some from seeking assistance.
But for our purposes the most interesting part of the opinion occurs when it
discusses what procedures are required. A "neutral factfinder" had to determine
whether the child was mentally ill, taking into account all available evidence, and
the continuing need for commitment and to be reviewed periodically. "[A] staff
physician will suffice," and "informal, -traditional medical investigative
techniques"' 4 7 could be used. "What is best for a child is an individual medical
decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case."' 4 Although
doctors were fallible, "the shortcomings of specialists can [not] always be avoided
by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical
science to an untrained judge ...." "I,Some had charged that parents often "dumped"
unruly children into state institutions. But "[iut is unrealistic to believe that trained
psychiatrists, skilled in eliciting responses, sorting medically relevant facts, and
sensing motivational nuances will often be deceived .... " " The Court acknowledged that medical decision-making was not "error-free," but was satisfied that
on balance "an independent medical decisionmaking process" protected children
enough to satisfy due process."'5 It summarized its views: "The State, through its
mental health programs, provides the authority for trained professionals to assist
parents in examining, diagnosing, and treating emotionally disturbed children.
Through its hiring practices, it provides well-staffed and well-equipped hospitals
and.. .conscientious public employees to implement the State's beneficient
purposes."''

'"
"'
1,6

Id. at 599.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
at
at
at
at
Id. at

1"7Id.
Id.
"I Id.
1o Id.
"4'

"'

607.
609.
611.
613.
616.
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With Parham v. J.R. we near the point at which professional behavior with
the requirements of the Constitution coincide. Georgia's procedures were adequate
152
precisely because they committed decisions to professionals.
V.

PRoFEssIoNAL NoRms AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW

So far I have discussed the near-merger of professional norms and constitutional rights in the setting of procedural due process. Sometimes the Court has
gone farther and adopted professional norms as substantive rules of constitutional
law.
There is a hint of this in Parham v. J.R. The Court devoted much of its analysis
to balancing the Eldridge factors, which included the interests of parents. But the
litigants there also included a class of children who were wards of the state. The
majority held that this did not affect the outcome of the balance. Although no
adult might care deeply about the children, there was a statutory presumption that
the state acted in the child's best interest. This was buttressed by the "extensive
' 53
written records that are compiled about each child while in the State's custody."'
Thus, social workers become just like parents.
Another mental health case is more explicit. Nicolas Romeo, a profoundly
retarded man, was involuntarily committed to a state institution for the retarded. 5
At the institution he was injured many times, both by other residents and by his
own actions. Eventually he was transferred to the institution's hospital, where he
was physically restrained for part of each day. Romeo claimed that involuntary
commitment without appropriate treatment and under circumstances leading to both
direct physical harm and deterioration of his mental condition was unconstitutional.
A unanimous Supreme Court agreed in substantial measure with Romeo. It found
his claims to safety and freedom of movement easy, but had more difficulty with
his claim to treatment, and concluded that his right extended to training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint. The Court also noted that Romeo's interests had to be balanced against state interests, for example in restraining him
in order to avoid injury to other residents. In striking that balance the Court held
that the Constitution requires "deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional."' 55 If such a professional in fact exercised professional judgment in
deciding to restrain him, Romeo's rights were not violated. This would limit "interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these
institutions .... " '5", A professional's decision violates a resident's rights "only when
the decision.. .is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
"ISSee also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (summary suspension of horse trainer by state
racing board, based on test revealing drugs in horse's blood, is constitutional, but prompt post-suspension

hearing required).
13 442 U.S. at 618-19.
' ' Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Id. at 322.

'

6

d.
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practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment."""S7 Here the Constitution requires what
professionals think appropriate.
More precisely, it requires that professionals exercise professional judgement.
The psychiatrists in Romeo would not be liable simply because their decisions were
at odds with those recommended by a majority of psychiatrists. Only decisions
so extreme as to be unprofessional give rise to liability. Similarly, the Court has
rejected the contention that a prison violates the Constitution by imposing "cruel
and unusual punishment" simply because it fails to comply with standards developed
by the professional association of prison administrators.' Yet neither of these rules
repudiates professionalism as a constitutional norm. They refuse to impose the norms
established by an external body but still treat the psychiatrists and jailers at the
institutions involved in the litigation as professionals, not political hacks.,
The Supreme Court's rules in abortion cases also incorporate the judgments
of professicnals and indeed of their associations. The basic abortion decisions held
that states had only a narrow authority to protect the health of the woman who
chose to have an abortion.' 60 They allowed the states to do so, in 1972, by requiring that abortions in the second trimester of pregnancy be performed in hospitals.
That requirement was consistent with the positions taken at that time by the
American Public Health Association (APHA) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)."' Eleven years later the Court considered a ban
on second-trimester abortions performed in clinics rather than hospitals.' 162 During the intervening years the APHA and the ACOG had changed their positions,
and by 1983 found no health purpose served by a hospitals-only requirement.'6 3
The Court relied heavily on the recommendations of these professional associa"I Id. at 323. A footnote defined "professional" as "a person competent, whether by education,
training, or experience to make the decision...." Id. at 323 n.30. Long-term decisions should be made
by people with medical or nursing degrees or with appropriate training. Day-to-day decisions could
be made by staff under the supervision of professionals. Id.
"' Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1980). One reason to reject that contention was discussed
by Justice Rehnquist in staying an order to remedy prison conditions in Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S.
1312 (1980): professional standards are to some extent efforts by the profession to secure resources
beyond those available through the usual political process. Prison administrators who wish to upgrade
their institutions can use such standards as clubs to beat their governors with, or to shame the governors into increasing the prison budget.
"I Where professional judgment is constrained by politicians' failure to provide resources, Romeo
holds that psychiatrists who do not exercise professional judgment are not individually liable for damages.
457 U.S. at 323. Here the bureaucracy is seen, in one version, as a professional agency unfortunately
at the mercy of external political forces, and in another version, as an agency comprised of deskilled
professionals. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65. If the psychiatrists themselves were political
hacks, that is, if the bureaucracy had been a politicized agency, they would be individually liable.
"I
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
162 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
162 Id.
263 Indeed, the ACOG had changed its position after the Akron ordinance had been passed and
a challenged to its constitutionality initiated. Id. at 2496.
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tions in finding unconstitutional a hospital-only ordinance that fit the requirements
the Court had laid down just eleven years before.
Again I must emphasize that I am not offering a universal explanatory theory
for these cases. I have in this section tried to identify a theme, latent in some cases
and openly expressed in others, of deference to professional judgments. The material
to this point strongly suggests that the Court has a vision of the welfare state in
which professional and rationalized bureaucracies are the norms, both in the sense
that most bureaucracies are like that and in the sense that bureaucracies ought to
be like that. It remains to reflect on that vision.
VI.

Tim

REPOLITICIZED BUREAUCRACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE

As we will see, many commentators find the Court's vision unattractive, as
I do too. But the first point to be made is simpler. Some of the normative force
behind the Court's vision comes from the fact that the vision evokes a sense that
things are really like that, and that the law has to accomodate reality. But in fact
things are not like that at all. The bureaucracies of the welfare state are indeed
heavily rule-governed, but operate without substantial regard to professional norms.
The Court has thus developed a constitutional law for an imaginary society and
has sought to persuade us that the imaginary world is our own.
One theme resounds through the literature on street-level professionals in
bureaucracies.' 64 They are regularly constrained by inadequate resources, the incredible numbers of decisions they are required to make, the complexity of the
decisions were professional norms honored, by routinely processing cases and by
trying to forget about doing the job they were taught to do in school. Their jobs
have become deskilled and they have been made into proletarians. 15 Mental health
professionals in public hospitals are reduced to administering drugs, and retain their
connection to their professional roots by calling doing nothing at all, which is all
they can do, "environmental therapy." Inded the Court in Romeo recognized
this when it held that a professional could not be held liable for monetary damages
where his or her failure to exercise professional judgment resulted from inadequate
resources.' 6' These conditions characterize what social workers do in public assistance
agencies, what teachers do in schools, and even what police officers do in keeping
the peace. 1 67 The public law of the welfare state bureaucracy, as the Court has
constructed it, offers us a way of thinking about bureaucracies that those in and
affected by them would find alien;
6' Beer, Political Overload and Federalism, 10 POLITY 1, 9 (1977); D. YATES, BUREAUCRATIC

DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN A~mEucAN GoVRN?61E

71-72, 95-96

(1982).

6I See, e.g., H. BRAvERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPIAL (1975); CASE STUDIES IN THE LABOR

PROCESS (A. Zimbalist ed., 1981).

" 457 U.S. at 323.
617See, e.g., J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEFAVIOR

16-34 (1968); W. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE

AND POLICE 56-61 (1970).
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And yet on another level the image the Court offers us is entirely accurate.
On the level of immediate experience we know that bureaucracies are shot through
with deskilled employees, that superiors make decisions based on personalities, that
beneath the surface of bureaucratic rules lies a dense network of personal associations that is what really lets the bureaucracy operate. But on the level of cultural
understanding we believe that rationality and professionalism characterize modern
society. When we translate that understanding into systematic theories we find
ourselves drawn to such aspects of utilitarianism as cost-benefit analysis. We have
seen that utilitarian ways of thinking pervade the law of due process. The Court's
image of society seems accurate to the extent that we deny our immediate experience
and embrace our cultural understandings.
A.

The ParticipatoryAlternative

Important commentators regard the utilitarian and technocratic way of thinking as unattractive. Jerry Mashaw and Frank Michelman have offered an alternative in which the provision of due process is a value in itself.' 6 This alternative
treats procedures as giving people chances to participate in the operation of the
institutions that affect them. To Mashaw, participation recognizes the dignity and
autonomy of the individual; to Michelman, it is a form of association that promotes the values of fraternity. Neither version of the participatory alternative is
satisfactory.
1.

The Utilitarian Version

Michelman and Mashaw could defend their alternatives as rectifying an omission in Eldridge's utilitarianism.' 69 Eldridge places in the balance the individual's
interest in receiving the benefits due him or her. A complete utilitarian test would
recognize that individuals have an interest as well in being treated in ways that
they believe are fair. The idea is that people who lose (and those who win) will
feel better after losing (or winning) if they believe that the results were generated
by a process in which they had a fair shot at winning (or losing). These feelings
have to be placed in the balance too.
As a formal statement of what utilitarianism requires this seems correct. That
it will have any effect on outcomes under Eldridge is, I think, questionable. It
seems likely that the interest in winning will usually be overwhelmingly larger than
the interest in good feeling. I will concede that occasionally losers will walk away
362 Mashaw, Three Factors,supra note 117; Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for
a Dignitary Theory, 61 B. U. L. REv. 885 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw, Dignitary Theory];
Michelman, supra note 66.
16' See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 29, at 885, 887 ("sense of unfair treatment"); Mashaw, Three
Factors,supranote 117, at 48. This follows Mashaw's criticism of the Court's balancing of the interests
it did identify. Id. at 38-45. See also Michelman, supra note 66, at 147. Mashaw, Dignitary Theory,
supra note 168, argues that the premises of liberal political theory support only an extremely thin theory
of participatory governance. See, e.g., id. at 887, 922, 926-29.
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feeling less bad if they lost after a full hearing than they would have if they had
lost after a summary proceeding. But my guess is that they will not feel much "less
bad," and I doubt whether winners will feel worse winning in a summary proceeding. Thus the increment that the participatory interest contributes to the Eldridge
balance seems to me likely to be small.
Further, this account trades on an intuition that is misplaced here. Perhaps
a utilitarian could get somewhere by including the participatory interest in deciding
whether process was due or not. But the issue in Eldridge is not the "all or nothing"
one; it is the marginal task of adding one or two new procedures to an existing
scheme. Lassiter shows how implausible it is to believe that the utilitarian has to
worry about losers walking away muttering to themselves, "If only I had been
allowed to cross-examine-but not with a lawyer at my side-...." In this sense
Goldberg v. Kelly may have been right: if you are going to provide process, you
are going to have to go all the way.
Utilitarian calculations could in principle yield "all or nothing" results: Unless
everything is provided, the weight added by the participatory interest is too small
to make a difference. Mashaw clearly wants to be able to make smaller moves,I"0
and Michelman, with his emphasis on associational values, explicitly prefers to be
able, in appropriate circumstances, to require something other than summary pro7
cedures but different from a full judicial trial.' '
In contemporary bureaucracies, however, informal procedures are likely to serve
ends other than dignity and association anyway. There is, first, the problem of
the "wired" procedure, the one in which the outcome is pre-determined not by
"the facts" but by the imperatives of the bureaucracy. Consider prison disciplinary
hearings. Guards sometimes - for my purposes it does not matter how often charge prisoners with violating rules where the rules have not been violated or have
been broken in a way that rarely elicits a response. The guards may be hot and
tired, or may not like the inmate, or whatever. To keep peace in the prison, superiors
must back up the guards and find that punishable offenses occurred. The inmate
receives an explanation of the outcome which he knows is false. A utiltarian might
think that patent arbitrariness would be better in the circumstances than fictitious
fairness. The point here is fairly general. As we have seen, although an "impartial" decision-maker is often required, impartiality does not mean that the decisionmaker not be part of a social network that will make him or her sensitive to the
bureaucracy's requirements. Not all proceedings are "wired," for sometimes the
decision-maker will know that the guard is a bad actor who should not be backed
up and will think that other guards ought to be sent a message. And sometimes
decision-makers will be far enough removed from the line officers to be able to
be truly impartial. But the Constitution seems to require neither arrangement.
In addition, there are what might be called the realities of informality. The
'"
"

See, e.g., Mashaw, Dignitary Theory, supra note 168, at 922, 926-29.
Micheman, supra note 66, at 149-53.
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Court has come closest to endorsing informal procedures in Goss v. Lopez, where
it required "less. than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon
himself .... " The principal just had to discuss the incident "informally" with the
student shortly after it occurred. One can be fairly confident about what such a
discussion would be, given the disparities in power between principal and student.
The principal has to back up his or her teachers; young people lack credibility.
The message in most instances will be, "Don't go away mad; just go away." And
a utilitarian would be satisfied by that result. This process, which I believe is inevitable in contemporary bureaucracies, is sometimes called "cooling out the
mark.""'
I conclude that building participatory and associational values into the utilitarian
calculation does not make it any more attractive: the values are unlikely to alter
many results, and whatever changes they produce are likely to serve ends that ought
not be served.
2.

The Nonutilitarian Version

Michelman and Mashaw could defend their alternatives by treating them as
nonutilitarian limits on the results of a utilitarian calculation. I discuss this only
briefly, because the obstacles to a successful defense along these lines seem huge.
The problem of determining which procedures are nonutilitarian limits on what
utilitarian processes arises again, and needs no further discussion. Further, Justice
Black pointed out in his dissent in Goldberg that procedures are costly. The
bureaucracies of the welfare state are doing things: locking up inmates, providing
material assistance to some of the needy, and so on. If more procedures are required, less of those things will be done. And many of them serve nonutilitarian
ends. It is not obvious how one could properly resolve the conflict between doing
more nonutilitarian stuff and providing more nonutilitarian procedures.'"
But the most fundamental difficulty is that under no sensible moral theory
is process in itself a value. To that extent Eldridge's instincts were correct. The
utilitarian version of the participatory alternative treats, as it must, what I have
called "feeling good" as the end that the process serves. Nonutilitarian versions,
I would think, will in the end defend process as serving democratic values, by giv-

"I I am convinced that an article by Erving Goffman is the source of my knowledge about "cooling out the mark," but I have been unable to locate the reference.
"I3See Smolla, supra note 6, at 93-94. Smolla attributes the trade-off between procedures and

material benefits as a political bargain struck with recipients of public assistance. Id. at 114-15. This

is, to say the least, a curious characterization of the politics of public assistance, in which various
elites purport to represent the interests of recipients. It is not obvious that a trade-off that those
elites bargain for is fairly attributable to the recipients themselves. See text accompanying note 141
for a similar criticism of a related argument.
See also J. RAwLS, A THEoRY oF Jus-ncE 41 (1971), criticizing analogous difficulties in what he
calls "intuitionist" theories. Cf. Mashaw, Three Factors,supra note 117, at 52 (claim to "nonalienation" does not "rank ahead of all other social values"); Mashaw, Dignitary Theory, sipra, note 168,
at 915-16 (Kantian theory allows claimant to use others, i.e., taxpayers, as means to his or her ends).
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ing people a say in the decisions that affect them.' 74 Yet that is precisely something
that due process does not do. None of the procedures give the client any authority
over the ultimate decision. They give clients a say, in the sense that they are allowed
to utter words in the presence of the decision-maker, but nothing requires that
the decision-maker listen, or listen seriously, or believe that the client's say has
added anything to what the decision-maker as a well-intentioned and sensitive person would have done anyway. Occasionally procedures will enhance democratic
participation, but they seem to me indirect and often ineffectual ways of empowering the clients of the welfare state.
Perhaps empowerment could be accomplished more directly.
B.

Repoliticizing the Bureaucracy

I have argued at some length that the Court's due process decisions embody
a vision in which welfare state bureaucracies are professionalized and rationalized,
and in which politics is not a proper basis for control within the bureaucracy. Here
I want to suggest that it might make sense to invert this vision, to embrace politics
and reject professionalism and its routines. Of course politics was driven out of
the bureaucracy for what seemed good reasons: Established elites thought that
politicized bureaucracies, dominated by the minions of immigrant political machines,
were corrupt and diverted resources from valuable social goals to the pockets of
brash upstarts. Professionalism was the elite's response. " 5 I do not want to romanticize the political bureaucracy. The elite's criticisms were frequeritly well-taken;
urban political machines perpetuated bigotry and tolerated violent crime where it
was profitable to do so. But knowing that, we may find it possible to develop
a politics that avoids those evils.
There is an apparent middle course. If professional norms guide the bureaucracy,
the interests of clients could be promoted by making it a professional norm that
client autonomy be respected. " 6 For example, we could install a serious commitment to informed consent in schools and mental institutions. This middle course
is however illusory because, as I have argued, professional norms do not in fact
guide the bureaucracy at the street level. If deskilling has progressed as far as it
seems, altering or enhancing the commitment to professional norms will not in
itself have much effect. We could take as a political program making the bureaucracy
truly professional, but that is not a modest middle course. It is instead, to use
a term I introduced earlier, a call for a revolution by the newly proletarianized.
I would just as soon - or would also - direct my attention to the clients
as well as to the deskilled bureaucrats. I want to conclude with suggestions about
some of the problems I have discussed. The first is Goss v. Lopez again. Instead
of trying to work out the right procedures for kicking kids out of school, we might
give the students charged with misconduct, or their parents, the power to veto any
See Mashaw, DignitaryTheory, supra note 168, at 930-31; Michelman, supra note 66, at 127-28.
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proposed disposition. Then the conversation between the student and the principal
would be a real one, not a disguised "cooling out the mark." We might hold in
reserve an incredibly formal system of hearings, as an inducement to the student
and principal to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition, and as a resource
if their conversation breaks down. In the hearing, of course, both the student and
the principal would have to be at risk. Now, I know that there are tough kids
who ought to be kicked out of school, but they still could be. And, though the
proposal is modestly utopian, we ought to consider that the conversation it promotes might be at least as educationally valuable as what goes on in schools today.'"
Even the utopianism is manageable, for it is undoubtedly true that, should any
group find it politically sensible to take my proposal as its program, the group
would modify it in the process of struggling for its adoption.
My second proposal is even more utopian, again with the qualification I have
just mentioned. In many areas the police see themselves and are seen as an occupying army. Things might be better in some places if responsibility for domestic tranquility were radically decentralized and deprofessionalized. Where it was possible
to handle through politics the inevitable issues of class and race that would arise,
we might try to establish neighborhood patrols as police forces. And again, wherever
it made sense to try to struggle to that end, the issues of class and race would
immediately be placed on the agenda. To succeed the group seeking neighborhood
patrols would have to handle them.
Finally, we could rethink Goldberg v. Kelly. The case was designed to increase
the resources available to the poor by making it harder to deny them public
assistance. Even if it did so by retaining some technically ineligible people on
the welfare rolls for a while longer, Goldberg could be defended on the ground
that most of the technically ineligible were nonetheless grindingly poor. In an era
when public assistance budgets were expanding, then, Goldberg served a useful
redistributive purpose. When ceilings were imposed on those budgets, it began to
achieve only redistribution from the abysmally poor to the merely poor. If we want
to aid the poor, Goldberg does so, if at all, only indirectly. As I have already
suggested, we might seek instead to establish a comprehensive income maintenance
scheme that would redistribute wealth in a way that would permanently eradicate
large disparities between the rich and the poor.
'"
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describing what recipients want from the administrative process itself. MAsHAW, Dignitary Theory, supra
note 168 at 930-31. Mashaw regards this as a demand to dismantle the administrative state. Id. at
904. Because the vast majority of benefits are disbursed routinely and without controversy, the sense
in which participatory values threaten the administrative state must be carefully specified. If It were
possible simply to add participatory values in disputed cases to routine respect for entitlements in all
the others, no threat would occur. But the conceptual bases of participation and of entitlement are
incompatible. Entitlements rest on the view that recipients are set apart from society and must be protected against it by a set of rights, while participation rests on the view that recipients and the society
form an integral whole. Thus, recognizing participatory values threatens the conceptual underpinnings
of the contemporary welfare state.
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Of course I offer none of these proposals as results that the Supreme Court
is likely to adopt in cases soon to come before it, though I must emphasize that
the arguments I have developed elsewhere establish that nothing stands in the Court's
way if it wanted to require that my proposals be adopted. Any political program
has to rest on an intense examination of the particulars of the situation we face,
and I have not presented the examination of schools and police forces here. Given
our present situation, too, I would not want the Court to preempt essential political
work by constitutionalizing my proposals. But utopian thinking is, I suggest, the
best way to begin fulfilling the promise of due process.
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